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THE FAILURE OF SOCIALIST UNITY IN BRITAIN
c. 1893-1914
By Keith Laybourn
READ 25 SEPTEMBER 1993 AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
SOCIALIST unity became an issue for the British left widiin a year of
the formation of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) in 1884. The
secession of William Morris and his supporters from the SDF and the
formation of the Socialist League in reaction to the autocratic leadership
of Henry Mayers Hyndman brought about a fundamental division
within British socialism. Subsequently the creation of other socialist
parties, most particularly the Independent Labour Party (ILP) led to
further disunity within die British socialist movement. Nevertheless,
notwidistanding die proliferation of British socialist societies with their
distinctive socialist credentials, diere were several attempts to form a
united socialist party between 1893 and 1914. They were normally
encouraged, on the one hand, by advocates of the 'religion of socialism'
such as William Morris, Robert Blatchford and Victor Grayson, and,
on the other, by Hyndman and the SDF. The aim of these efforts was
to strengdien socialist organisation in times of both political failure and
success, but in every instance diey failed due to the intractable problem
of bringing together socialists of distinctively different persuasions under
the umbrella of one party. These failures have led recent historians to
debate two major questions connected with socialist unity. First, diey
have asked at what point did socialist unity cease to be a viable
alternative to the Labour Alliance between the ILP and the trade
unions? Stephen Yeo feels that socialist unity became impossible after
die mid 1890s, David Howell suggests that this 'suppressed alternative'
became unlikely about five to ten years later, as die leaders of die
Independent Labour Party opted for the trade union rather than
socialist alliance, whilst Martin Crick feels diat socialist unity was still
a viable alternative to at least 1911, if not 1914, when a determined
effort was made to form the British Socialist Party, die one socialist
party and forerunner of die Communist Part of Great Britain." Thus
' D . Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party 1888-1906 (1984), 389-97; S.
Yeo, 'A New Life; The Religion of Socialism in Britain, 1883—1896', History Workshops
Journal, IV (Autumn, 1977), 5-56; M. Crick, 'A Call to Arms'; the Struggle for Socialist
Unity in Britain, 1883-1914', in The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party (eds.)
D.James, T. Jowitt and K. Laybourn (1992), 181-204.
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the dates of 1895, 1900 to 1906 or 1911 are offered as the alternative
years when the prospects of socialist unity in Britain reached a water-
shed. Historians have been equally divided on the second, and related,
question of why was socialist unity not achieved? In particular, they have
focused upon two subsidiary questions. First, why did the Independent
Labour Party choose the Alliance with trade unions and parliamentary-
route way to power rather than socialist unity? Secondly, how important
was the intransigence and narrowness of the Social Democratic Fed-
eration in thwarting moves towards socialist unity? Some writers have
noted the steadfast opposition of the ILP leadership as the main
problem whilst others have focused upon the inflexible and domineering
nature of Henry Mayers Hyndman and the quasi-Marxist Social
Democratic Federation, offering the 'image of die Social Democratic
Federation as a narrow and dogmatic sect unsuited to the rigours of
British politics'.2
This paper will argue diat there was little real prospect of socialist
unity being achieved in Britain after die mid 1890s and that die reason
for the failure of socialist unity campaigns is to be found in the diverse
and compromising nature of die ILP and die continued intransigence
of the SDF, or Social Democratic Party as it became in 1907. Even if
die domineering influence of Hyndman has been blown up out of
proportion into a marvellous myth, it is clear that even in 1912 his
antipathy towards industrial action, amongst odier issues, still prevented
die newly-formed British Socialist Party, die 'one united socialist party',
from presenting any type of common front for British socialism. If
anyone doubts die inflexibility of die leadership of SDF/SDP then diey
have to explain away die conflicts and tensions evident in the failure
of die BSP between 1911 and 1914, particularly widi regard to syn-
dicalism, strike action, defence and foreign policy.
As Yeo suggests, by die mid 1890s, with the political failure of die
ILP in die general election of 1895 which Beatrice Webb dubbed 'die
most expensive funeral since Napoleon'3, Keir Hardie and other ILP
leaders were forced to choose between the business of'making socialists'
and die need to make a political party. Up die 1890s socialism was in
die business of 'making socialists' and it did not matter which socialist
organisation an individual belonged to. Yeo argues that, after the 1895
general election and the deadi of William Morris on 1896, the ILP and
odier socialist groups chose to become entrenched in a trade-union
" Howell, British Workers and the ILP, 389. This is a view which Martin Crick challenges
in his article 'A Call to Arms'.
3R. Moore, The Labour Party i88o-ig24 (1978), 53, quoting Beatrice Webb's Diary, 10
July 1895-
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alliance that focused upon parliamentary and local political organ-
isation. The need to win elections, and electioneering, replaced the
ethical aspects of socialism which had focused upon leading the moral
and ethical life of a socialist. The general drift of Yeo's argument does
not seem unfair, although some of the fine detail has proved contentious.
Indeed, Yeo has emphasised that party connection became much more
important to socialists towards the end of the 1890s. David Howell
accepts much of what Yeo says although he dates the rise of elec-
tioneering and its impact upon die prospects for socialist unity to the
early years of the ILP and trade unions alliance: 'The ILP pursuit of
trade union influence rendered socialist unity a still viable but less likely
option.'4 This view seems plausible but what is difficult to accept is the
argument of Martin Crick, who, looking from the point of view of the
SDF, seeks to extend the socialist unity debate to at least 1911, and
possibly 1914. His argument is that many socialists were unattached,
that the ILP and the SDF worked closely together in Lancashire, and
that the socialist revival of the 1904 to 1909 period ensured that there
was an alternative to the trade-union alliance on the eve of the First
World War and that the SDF was far more flexible and less sectarian
than is often supposed. Nevertheless, his argument and supporting
evidence could be interpreted in another way. As Jeff Hill has noted,
the SDF in Lancashire appeared to be detached from die policies of
its parent organisation and its success may have been despite the actions
of its national body.5 It is also possible that die vibrancy of socialism
was just as likely to produce sectarian rigidity as it was likely to engender
a desire for social unity, as each organisation viewed its own individual
successes as confirmation of the correctness of its policies. In die final
analysis, die intransigence of both the ILP and the SDF, and the success
of die ILP-trade union alliance in 1906 made socialist unity a highly
unlikely proposition and confirmed die experience of the previous
twenty years that socialism in Britain was to be characterised more by
schism dian unity. Indeed, there was litde prospect of socialist unity
being achieved in die 1890s and none after 1906 when die Labour
Representation Committee /Labour Party had established its trade
union credentials and parliamentary achievements.
In August 1911, Victor Grayson, a controversial figure whose par-
liamentary by-election victory at Colne Valley in 1907 had been an
inspiration to British socialists, wrote that 'The time for the formation
1
 Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 393-7.
5J. Hill, 'Social Democracy and the Labour Movement: the Social Democratic
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of the BRITISH SOCIALIST PARTY had definitely come.'6 He then
called for others to follow his example and to withdraw from the
Independent Labour Party, vowing never to join another socialist
organisation until the BSP, the 'one socialist party', had been formed.
Grayson's appeal worked briefly. There was a period of ecstatic enthusi-
asm leading up to the Socialist Unity conference in Manchester in
September 1911, when a clamour of support emerged. Within a week
of his appeal Grayson was writing that 'The British Socialist Party is
practically an accomplished fact . . . the response has been extra-
ordinary.'7 After the Unity Conference, Grayson wrote that it 'was the
most harmonious and unanimous Conference of the kind that has ever
been held'.8 Throughout the autumn and winter months of 1911,
hundreds of members of the ILP wrote to Grayson and the Clarion
expressed their disgust at the recent policies of the Party and extending
a warm welcome to the BSP.'9 It seemed that the dream of uniting
socialists of all persuasions under the umbrella of one organisation was
about to become reality. The attempt had been made several times
previously but this moment seemed propitious for Britain was experi-
encing a period of serious industrial unrest and both the ILP and the
Labour Party were under attack because of their failure to lead in the
fight for socialism. Yet support for the BSP seemed to evaporate almost
as quickly as it had emerged. The vast majority of ILP members were
not attracted to it and the new party, the BSP, was soon little more
than the old Social Democratic Federation, then the Social Democratic
Party, in a new form. Yet for a brief moment, carried forward by the
impetus of Grayson's enthusiasm and changes within the SDF, the BSP
promised to be something more. Some ILP members and their branches
went over to the new organisation. Yet, in the end, the BSP left the
ILP remarkably unscathed. The British Socialist Party was eventually
undermined and destroyed by the bitter disagreements that had blighted
earlier moves towards socialist unity and had made earlier efforts
untenable.
The idea of forming a united socialist party was, clearly, not new in
1911 and, indeed, it was fitting that Grayson should begin his campaign
in the Clarion for it was Robert Blatchford, its editor, who had set the
precedent by his staunch advocacy of the ideal during the 1890s. In
1894, Robert Blatchford had called for the formation of 'One Socialist
Party' maintaining that
^Clarion, 4 August 1911.
1
 Ibid., 11 August 1911.
"Ibid., 6 October 1911.
9Ibid., 18 August 1911.
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The only hope of the emancipation of Labour lies in Democratic
Socialism
A true Labour Party should therefore be a Socialist Party.
A true Socialist Party should consist of Socialists, and of none others
but Socialists.
Now, the Independent Labour Party does not consist wholly of
Socialists.
It has in its ranks very many men who are not Socialists. These men
are a source of danger and weakness.
I am perfectly convinced myself that the only men likely to fight
victoriously for Socialism are Socialists, and that the first and greatest
work of all true Socialists to undertake is the formation of a united
Socialist party . . . I desire to see the one party, and I shall continue
to advocate the formation of one party, but if it is formed it must be
formed by the action of the members of the various existing bodies.10
Blatchford's clarion call was loud and clear; it was a demand that the
ILP, the SDF and the Clarion Scouts should submerge their differences
and unite all genuine socialists into one party. It was an extension to
the provinces, and to the whole of the socialist movement, of the
concept of unity amongst socialist organisations. Moves in that direction
had already occurred in London in 1892 and 1893. William Morris and
his Hammersmith Socialist Society, had promoted an agreement on
aspects of socialist thought which was carried to the SDF and the
Fabians. Yet, this movement aimed at seeking agreement upon points
of socialist theory rather than of building unity of action around issues
of common importance to all socialists." The result was the rather
vague and imprecise, although too revolutionary for the Fabians,
Manifesto of English Socialists issued on May Day 1893. Apart from the
fact that it attempted to present a common ground between the Fabians
and the SDF, the main weakness of the document was that it was
agreed without reference to the newly-formed national ILP. Blatchford's
appeal was something of an attempt to rectify this omission and to
obtain unity of action among all socialist parties. Nevertheless, the
campaign proved to be mistimed and misplaced, and Blatchford's faith
was unfounded.
Blatchford's readers were being urged to form some type of socialist
fellowship, without regard to party affiliation, but hopefully with the
support of the ILP and the SDF leadership. In other words, he envisaged
the possibility of a mass socialist party, or fellowship, coming into
existence. Such support was not forthcoming, Hyndman was reluctant,
"Ibid., 22 December 1894.
" E. P. Thompson, William Morris, Romantic and Revolutionary (1971), 605-10.
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Keir Hardie positively hostile, and even Tom Mann, more favourably
inclined than most to Blatchford's suggestions, was cautious.12 The ILP
was particularly concerned to present a clear and unclouded image
to the electorate at the coming general election, and the National
Administrative Council made it clear that it did not wish to confuse
the electorate by changing the name of the party or by 'diverting the
attention of the part from the main issues'. It had set its course, and
socialist unity was to be no part of its strategy.'3
Nevertheless, die failures of socialist and ILP candidates in the 1895
general election revived the prospects of socialist unity. The defeat of
29 ILP candidates, including Keir Hardie, stirred doubts about the
wisdom of the ILP's policy. When its membership fell from 35,000 to
20,000 between 1895 and 1896, some members began to campaign to
unify the ILP with the SDF. At diis point, it is essential to understand
the respective positions of the ILP and the SDF, the two main socialist
organisations in Britain.
There were marked divisions within die ILP both between die
leadership and the rank and file, and also within the rank and file
based upon geographical differences. The ILP leadership was adamantly
opposed to any moves towards unity with die SDF. The 1895 general
election defeats had convinced the 'big four'—Keir Hardie, J. Bruce
Glasier, Philip Snowden and J. Ramsay MacDonald—of die need to
form a progressive alliance widi the trade unions in order to win
parliamentary seats. To them it dius became more important to win
trade-union support than to rush headlong into socialism, and socialism
was to be delayed, possibly until 1953 according to Hardie reflecting
upon the 1,953 v°tes he had received in his unsuccessful parliamentary
by-election contest at Bradford East in November 1896.'4 In any case,
socialism became a long-term ratfier an immediate objective. As David
Howell has suggested, the ILP leaders now became 'subject to con-
servative influences'.'5 In contrast, some of the rank and file began to
advocate a return to die business of 'making socialists' in the way that
William Morris, Robert Blatchford and others advocated. This was a
move towards the idea being put forward by Robert Blatchford, to
whom Hardie was personally opposed.'6
Nevertheless, faced with electoral defeats and a loss of membership
"Clarion, 22 December 1894 and subsequent issues indicate the nature of the response.
I3NAC of the ILP, minute book M.890/1/1, Coll. Misc. 464, meetings for 1894,
deposited in the British Library of Political Science.
''Bradford Observer, 12 November 1896.
15
 Howell, British Workers and the ILP, 118.
''Their hostility had been nurtured further in 1895 when Hardie supported John
Lister, Treasurer of the ILP, against the local criticism of the Halifax ILP which had
been nurtured by both Montague and Robert Blatchford.
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Keir Hardie agreed to support the idea of a conference of all Socialist
organisations, trade unions and co-operative bodies, and the ILP's
Easter Conference of 1896 instructed the NAC to organise such a
conference, an 'Informal Conference', which was held on 29 July i8g7,
after some preliminary meetings.
Initially, die SDF leadership was unwilling to respond to these
overtures but appears to have changed its mind when a combination
of financial difficulties, due to expenditure on die Southampton par-
liamentary by-election and internal pressure within the party, forced its
leaders to think anew.'7 As a result it decided to send five delegates to
the 'Informal Conference' where it was agreed that a joint committee
would be set up until decisions were made about the nature and name
of the new arrangement. An additional committee was formed to deal
widi arbitration in electoral disputes. Subsequendy, H. W. Lee, secretary
of the SDF, gave his support to attempts for 'real unity of people
anxious and willing to work together for a common object' of socialist
unity.'8 There was men a referendum of the joint membership of die
ILP and die SDF which voted 5,158 to 886 in favour of fusion. Yet
diat decision was never implemented.
Keir Hardie immediately intervened to inform die ILP diat less dian
one-third of its paying membership had in fact voted, and a decision
on me ballot was postponed until die next annual conference. In die
meantime, Hardie campaigned strongly against fusion, expressing his
views through the pages of die Labour Leader and die ILP News. He
maintained diat 'Rigidity is fatal to growdi as I think our SDF friends
are finding out', and reflected upon the possible loss of trade-union
support for die two organisations if diey merged. His attitude was
neady presented in die ILP News:
It may be that tiiere is somediing in die mediods of propaganda, if
not in die principle,, of die SDF that not only renders it somewhat
antipadietic to our members, but out of touch and harmony with
me feelings and ideals of die mass of our people. If, too, it be die
case diat die SDF, even if not decaying, is not growing in membership,
die indication would seem to be that it has not proceeded on die
lines of British industrial evolution. It might be, therefore, diat die
introduction of its spirit and mediods of attack would check radier
dian help forward our movement.'9
Political expediency was clearly more important dian socialist unity
as Hardie began to campaign for federation. His leading spokesman of
"M. Crick, 'A Call to Aims', 184.
18
 Justice, 7 August 1897.
'^ILs, August 1897.
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this strategy was J. Bruce Glasier, whose paper at the ILP Conference
in Birmingham, of April 1897, maintained that federation and continued
separate existence would be advantageous to the ILP. The crux of his
argument was that
the ways of the SDF are not our ways. If I may say so, the ways of
the SDF are more doctrinaire, more Calvinistic, more aggressively
sectarian than the ILP. The SDF has failed to touch the hearts of
the people. Its strange disregard of the religious, moral and aesthetic
sentiments of the people is an overwhelming defect. The ILP position,
moreover, is better understood by the public. There is in truth, no
party in the land whose aims are more clearly defined in the popular
mind than ours. The trades unions have begun to rely upon us, and
are depending upon our lead, and were we to abolish ourselves
another ILP—perhaps owing to our desertion, a less resolute one—
would inevitably take up our ground.20
What Glasier was doing was contrasting the ethical and nonconformist
basis of much of the ILP support with the more economic-based
Marxist tradition and was clearly exaggerating his case. But Glasier's
views counted for a lot both in areas like the West Riding of Yorkshire,
where the SDF had little support, and also amongst those ILPers who
were also members of trade unions and were offended by Hyndman's
well known opposition to industrial action. When faced with the
decision to form socialist organisations in 1885, the socialists of Bradford
and Leeds had opted to form branches of William Morris's Socialist
League rather than Hyndman's SDF. The scandal of the SDF's accept-
ance of Tory money in contesting the 1885 election, the famous 'Tory
Gold' issue, had also alienated many socialists from Hyndman and the
SDF.
Not surprisingly, the National Administrative Council of the ILP
supported Hardie's demand for federation and resolved that the decision
between fusion and federation should be resolved by a new ballot of
ILP members in which a three-quarter vote of the total membership
in favour of fusion would have to be recorded if action were to be
taken. The Conference accepted this advice and the vote was held in
July 1898 when 2,397 voted for federation and 1,695 f° r fusion. The
ILP leadership had, effectively blocked the prospect of a united socialist
party being formed and H. W. Lee, stressed that the SDF was 'in favour
of fusion'.2' The discussions on socialist unity expired.
The belated efforts of Robert Blatchford to revive negotiations also
failed. In spite of the Clarion decision to conduct a poll of its readers,
™ ILP Annual Conference Report, 1898, 8.
"Justice, 27 August 1898.
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which produced a vote of 4,429 for fusion and 3,994 for federation the
ILP leaders were not inclined to be led from their refuge of 'federation'.22
The ILP leadership had thwarted the early attempts to form a
socialist unity party in their desire to win trade union support. But how
much support was there amongst the ILP rank and file for the socialist
unity alternative? The available evidence suggests that there were deep
divisions, very largely dependent upon geographical regions.
As both Martin Crick and Jeff Hill have suggested, there appears to
have been strong support for the alliance idea in Lancashire, an area
where both the SDF and the ILP were well entrenched. The idea of
socialist unity appears to have emerged strongly in Salford in the early
1890s when the local SDF was active in the process which led to the
formation of the local ILP and involved in the attempts to form a
branch of the Gasworkers' Union at the Manchester and Salford
Gasworks in the summer of 1889.23 In other words, there was a sense
of Labour solidarity evident in Salford, Manchester, Burnley, Blackburn
and other centres. And Lancashire, as Watmough has pointed out, was,
next to London, the most important centre of SDF activity—occasion-
ally recording more members than the London branches were able to
do.24 Indeed, as Jeff Hill suggests, 'the most marked feature of SDF
tactics in Lancashire was their flexibility.'25 In the socialist unity debates
of 1896 to 1898 support for fusion was firm from the Lancashire
branches as indicated by the annual conference of 1896 when Fred
Brocklehurst of Manchester introduced a motion to change the name
the ILP's name to the 'National Socialist Party'. When it became
known that the NAC had rejected the SDF's terms for fusion there was
a strong and immediate reaction in Lancashire. Many branches felt
that the NAC was cheating the party by insisting on an overwhelming
vote in favour on the second ballot before the principle of fusion could
proceed. The NAC attempted to justify its switch of policy with the
SDF by asserting that 'In Blackburn, Nelson, Rochdale, Ashton and
several other places the local branches of the ILP and SDF already
work cordially side by side and for elections and many propaganda
purposes are already virtually federated together'.26 Many of the Lanca-
shire ILP branches begged to differ and saw co-operation as the basis
for fusion. Iittleborough ILP called for 'one militant socialist party'
whilst the branches at Droylsdon and Preston refused to enter the ILPs
second ballot because they had already voted decisively for fusion.
"Clarion, 3 December 1898.
"
3Hill, 'Social-Democracy', 47, and Justice, 14 September 1889.
24
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25Hill, 'Social Democracy', 51.
*ILP Conference Report, 1899.
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Bolton West, Everton and Blackburn opposed the NAC, and Stockport
announced its intention 'to withdraw from the party' as a protest
against the undemocratic action of the NAC."7 Charles Higham, of
the Blackburn ILP, emphasised the point at the 1899 national ILP
conference when he claimed that the socialist co-operation in his own
town illustrated the ridiculous position of the NAC and the ILP
leadership.28
At the other extreme there was far less support for socialist unity in
the textile region of the West Riding of Yorkshire, one of the major
centres of ILP support. The West Riding was still one of the most
active of the ILP areas even when ILP membership declined in the
late 1890s. In 1897 m e m* News stated that 'Halifax has 730 paying
members and these, being well organised, are probably the strongest
socialist body in the country'.29 At the same time the Bradford's
branches recorded between 800 and 900 fee-paying members. The
Keighley ILP had 120 members, the four main Huddersfield clubs had
235 members, and the Leeds, Hunslet and Holbeck branches had 237
members. Most other Yorkshire towns had small but viable branches.
In fact, an examination of the 11,000 to 12,000 fee-paying members of
the National ILP indicates that between 2,700 and 3,000 came from
the West Riding.30 The National ILP was strongly influenced by West-
Riding opinion, which in turn was shaped by the attitudes of the
powerful branches in Bradford and Halifax.
In Bradford the rejection of socialist unity was all too evident. In
September and October 1897, there was almost total rejection of the
idea. This is hardly surprising when one considers that the Bradford
Labour Movement had built up a thriving club organisation of about
twenty-seven or twenty-eight clubs and 2,000 members in the early
1890s, with considerable trade-union support. Even though their mem-
bership declined in the late 1890s they still provided social, educational
and recreational activities for their members and their families and
were a powerful political force within the working-class community.
There was no way in which the SDF could challenge the over-
whelming dominance of the ILP. By the summer of 1895 it had only
three modestly-sized branches in Leeds and smaller ones in Hull,
Bingley and Low Bentham.3' There was also a branch in Dewsbury
"'Reports in the NAC Minute book, i6June, i6June~isjuly and throughout August—
September and November to December 1898. Abo quoted in J. Hill, 'The ILP in
Lancashire', in The Centennial History of the ILP, 50.
28
 Hill, 'The ILP in Lancashire', 50 and ILP Conference Report, 1899.
"> ILP News, June 1897.
30Ibid., September and October 1898 and March 1899.
31M. Crick, 'A Collection of Oddities': The Bradford Branch of the Social-Democratic
Federation', The Bradford Antiquary, Third Series, number 5, 27.
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which challenged and then took over the ILP and a small branch in
Halifax. In August 1895, a Bradford branch was formed but it started
with six members, never had more than 28, averaged about fifteen,
and expired in 1897, and as Martin Crick states:
Elsewhere in Yorkshire the outlook was similarly bleak. Of the three
Leeds branches only Armley maintained an active existence. Low
Bentham, Skipton and Sheffield branches clung tenuously to life
until mid-1898 and they too collapsed. Those who were sympathetic
to the SDF undoubtedly followed the example of W. P. Redfearn of
Huddersfield who reported he had joined the ILP for want of a
viable alternative and that he hoped eventually for the unity of the
two parties. The only exception to this gloomy scenario was in
Dewsbury, where an ILP branch had always supported socialist unity
and had been sceptical as to the value of trade unions was 'organised
out of existence' by a capable SDFer from Burnley.32
The fact is diat the SDF presented no threat to the dominance of
the ILP in the West Riding of Yorkshire and that the ILP branches,
and particularly those in Halifax and Bradford, had established close
links with the trade unions and were already pursuing the type of
policies that Hardie was advocating. Thus, in 1896, the Bradford Labour
Echo argued that 'The time has not come for the thorough fusion of
forces which the creation of such a party would demand . . . The
formation of such a party before the time was ripe would bring nothing
but mischief.'33 Indeed, this was the dominant view, even though
Keighley ILP voted in favour of fusion and the Morley branch seceded
and the Dewsbury SDF and ILP branches fused.
Throughout 1898, when the Bradford ILP clubs were examining the
possibility of reorganising the party into one centralised branch, rather
than three constituency branches and numerous clubs, attempts to
create a united socialist organisation failed. It is obvious that during the
discussions various socialist societies had misinterpreted the intentions of
the Bradford ILP when its general council had decided to meet
a committee of 15 'outsiders'. This attempt to widen support was
misunderstood. As the Bradford Labour Echo reflected:
They the outsiders endeavoured to ignore the fact that the meeting
was an ILP branch meeting, and proceeded to treat the gathering
as one specially called to bring into being an entirely new Socialist
party. Some of the outsiders who proposed to serve on the committee
^Ibid., 28-9 and Clarion, 20 December 1901.
33
 Bradford Labour Echo, 11 April 1896.
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withdrew their names, when die meeting passed die following res-
olution: 'That die fifteen members elected from die meeting should
declare themselves Socialists who were willing to become members
of the ILP under the reconstituted constitution.' Carried by an
overwhelming majority...
The Bradford Observer report, reprinted in die same issue of die Echo,
was even more direct: 'One fact made quite clear was diat no fusion
of Socialist Sections is intended. The representatives of various smaller
Socialist bodies attended, and did tiieir best to turn die discussion into
diis groove, but entirely widiout avail.'
There was litde support for die idea of fusion widiin die Bradford
ILP and equally litde support for die idea in Halifax. The July 1898
issue of die Record, organ of die Halifax ILP, did refer to die 'One
Socialist Party' campaign going on in Bradford but played down its
importance, doubting its 'practical superiority' to die existing situation.
The report argued diat die term fusion suggested a hardening of social
policies which did not fit die more general approach favoured by die
members of die Halifax ILP. Also most ILP members spent a working
week protected by trade-union surveillance, and weekends attending
Labour Church activities, glee club meetings and rambles. Satisfied
widi their achievements diey were not inclined to join forces witii a
society which had litde presence in Halifax and which appeared to
play down the value of trade unionism. On the whole one is left widi
die impression diat socialist unity barely merited serious consideration
in the ILP strongholds of Bradford and Halifax. Also, die Yorkshire
Divisional Council of die ILP had rejected die idea, by 32 voters to
sixteen, as early as October 1894.M In Bradford, Halifax and more
generally diroughout die West Riding of Yorkshire tiiere was litde or
no inclination to join widi an organisation diat carried no political
weight or support. Martin Crick has suggested, die socialist unity
movement was probably a movement from the bottom up, but even
diis is partial and barely evident in some areas, most notably die West
Riding of Yorkshire.
It would appear diat diere was litde prospect that socialist unit would
be achieved in the late 1890s. There were four main reasons for diis.
In the first place die ILP leaders and many of dieir supporters had
attached dieir flags to the trade union mast. Secondly, diere were
intense rivalries widiin the broader socialist movement between Hardie
and Blatchford on die one hand, and between Hardie and Hyndman
on the odier. Thirdly, if die ILP was driven by political expediency so
was the SDF, whose leadership showed no inclination towards socialist
34Labour Leader, 6 October 1894.
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unity until it began to lose members in the late 1890s and once
the Southampton parliamentary by-election faced it widi financial
embarrassment. Fourthly, whilst just under half the rank and file
members of the ILP favoured fusion the other half, possibly the majority,
favoured federation and it was this second body, firmly based in
Yorkshire, which carried most political clout with the ILP leaders.
Given these facts it is not surprising that the attempts at socialist unity
in the 1890s ended in failure, and that future efforts would be blighted
by similar problems.
It is true, as Martin Crick suggests, that there was nothing unusual
in socialists having dual membership with the ILP and the SDK Quite
clearly it didn't matter to many socialists which organisation they joined
for to them a socialist Britain was imminent. But after the 1895 general
election defeats it was more difficult to sustain hope for the immediate
success of socialism and electioneering and leadership considerations
got in the way of sustaining any hopes of socialist success. Indeed, the
experience of Lancashire should not be emphasised too much for, as
Jeff Hill suggests, there were two factors that needed to be taken into
consideration. One is that the Lancashire SDF branches acted more
flexibly than their parent organisation did, and some branches still
remained in the Labour Representation Committee even after their
parent organisation had left. Secondly, they paid a price for their
flexibility for, as Jeff Hill suggests, 'Though on the one hand local
autonomy was a source of strength in diat it allowed social-democrats
to adapt to their immediate environment, on the other hand, it
produced a movement notoriously prone to internal divisions over
strategy and one which ultimately was unable to preserve its identity
as a united socialist force.'35
Even if socialist unity had been achieved it seems unlikely that it
would have survived. Most probably, the ILP would have split, with
Hardie leading his West Yorkshire contingent and other supporters into
an alternative ILP-like organisation. In effect the SDF would probably
have been left with its own supporters and a few other socialists, much
as occurred when the British Socialist Party was formed in 1911.
There was a second phase in the development of socialist unity at
the beginning of the twentieth century. The Labour Representation
Committee [LRC] was formed as a result of a conference held in
February 1900 and, at first sight, appeared to have met the needs of
both alternative strategies for the progress of the Labour movement.
On the one hand, it was an alliance between the trade unions and die
^Hill, 'Social Democracy', 53.
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socialist parties and, on the other, it brought the socialist parties,
including the SDF and the ILP, into one organisation. Although the
LRC was not a socialist organisation, as such, five of the twelve
members of the Executive Committee were Socialists and there was a
prospect that this alliance could be the basis of a closer co-operation
between the SDF and the ILP. Yet within eighteen months of the
founding conference the SDF voted to secede. This decision was taken
because 'We were being committed to the support of men and measures
with which we did not agree'.36 Indeed, die ILP and SDF had clashed
from the outset when the ILP failed to support the SDF resolution
committing the LRC to socialist objectives.
The SDF's secession from the LRC was a mistake for it now cut
itself off from the most influential independent political organisation of
the working classes, although its action is explicable in terms of the
internal difficulties within the party which led to the secession of two
groups who formed the Socialist Party of Great Britain and die Socialist
Labour Party, usually known as the 'Impossibilists'.
At this point the SDF appears to have revived its interest in socialist
unity. Whether that was ever a realistic option seemed doubtful and
David Howell has concluded that socialist unity had effectively been
ruled out by the formation of the LRC: 'The logic of national events
. . . combined with local developments . . . to erode the United Socialist
alternatives, even in an environment where it had developed a significant
presence.'37
Only Martin Crick seems to doubt this judgement. He bases his
assessment upon a number of factors but, most importantly, the situation
that existed in Lancashire, which has already been referred to. Quite
clearly, there was a demand for socialist unity in Lancashire but this
did not represent the dominant feeling of the ILP members many of
who were drawn to the prospect of working through the LRC alliance
at bodi the local and national levels. In any case, the Lancashire SDF
branches, who had pushed the SDF towards affiliating with the LRC
were dismayed by the withdrawal of their parent organisation and this
appears to have caused something of a slump in the SDF activities in
the county.
Crick's second line of argument is to stress diat the Dewsbury
parliamentary by-election of 1902 provided an insight of what could be
achieved by socialist unity at a period when ILP and LRC parliamentary
victories were still thin on the ground. His argument is that die SDF
36
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put forward Harry Quelch, the editor of Justice, as the SDF candidate
because it feared that the local Trades Council and the ILP would
impose a compromise lib-Lab candidate, Sam Woods of the Wigan
Miners, who might be accepted by the local Liberals. The Trades
Council and ILP reaction of putting forward Edward Robertshaw
Hartley, a butcher who was soon to become a member of both the
SDF and the ILP, rebounded because he refused the candidature and
gave his support to Quelch. He later added that 'The great work of
the official section of the ILP at present seems not so much to
push Socialism as to try and intrigue some half-a-dozen persons into
Parliament.38 And yet, despite the opposition of the Trades Council
and the ILP, the electorate of Dewsbury gave 1,597 votes to Quelch,
517 votes more than Hartley had secured in the 1895 general election.
Here was, as A. M. Thompson of the Clarion, wrote
a crushing blow to the conflicting 'Leaders' and a triumphant
vindication of Socialist Unity . . . The rank and file of Dewsbury
have shown the way. Socialists of all denominations have shut their
eyes to the scowlings and nudgings of rival party officials and stood
shoulder to shoulder for Socialism.39
The actions of the ILP were further criticised by a plethora of letters
and articles in Justice, which, amongst other things, attacked the
doctrines of the ILP as 'a heterogeneous conglomeration of absurdities
and self contradictions. Their principles, as exemplified and illustrated
by their tactics, are no principles but only political expediency.'40
Crick's viewpoint is highly biased in favour of the SDF and thus
open to the criticism that it lacks balances. If, for instance, the Dewsbury
parliamentary by-election of February 1902 caused a 'damaging split
in the Labour movement' as Crick suggests, why should this necessarily
revive the spirit of Socialist Unity?4' There was, indeed, some criticism
within ILP ranks about the effectiveness of the LRC but equally there
was strong commitment to the view that trade unionists should be
drawn into the independent political labour movement.
The ILP also retorted to the SDF's actions with a fusillade of abuse
against the charge that the SDF had cheated by calling a joint meeting
of all the Labour organisations to elect a candidate and then had pre-
empted the meeting by announcing Harry Quelch to be their candidate.
38
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The ILPNews reflected that
The SDF has taken up the attitude of having its own isolated and
impossibilist way, and setting up at defiance the ILP and the Trades
Council. It is unity no doubt—the unity of itself. [...] We are
disputing the pretence under which he has been placed in the field
as 'the Socialist and Trade Union candidate', and we are disputing
the suggestion that his candidature is anything but an unnecessary
and humiliating reproach upon the reputation of Socialism. [...] An
isolated SDF candidate would prove a very lamentable and futile
political escapade, and would provide a very bad advertisement for
Socialism in the West Riding of Yorkshire. Without the cardinal co-
operation of the Trades Unions, no third, not to speak of a fourth
candidate, would receive an effective vote in the division.42
And 1,597 votes was not that good when one considers that Hartley
had contested the seat in 1895 when socialist fortunes were in decline.
Widi more voters and a well-organised trade union movement the vote
should have been much larger. Compared to the Conservative vote of
4,512 and the Liberal vote of 5,660, Quelch's vote was small, being
about 14 per cent of the votes that were cast.43
The second phase of Socialist Unity, if it can be regarded as such, did
not lead very far but Crick is quite correct to suggest that there were
strong moves towards its further advocacy between 1904 and 1911,
although that is not to suggest that it was a viable proposition. The
SDF certainly changed its attitude towards Socialist Unity and fully
embraced the Amsterdam Conference resolution of 1904 which
instructed Socialist parties in all countries to amalgamate. It made
approached to renew negotiations with die ILP in 1907, 1909 and 1910
but the ILP laid down the precondition that the SDF should re-affiliate
with die SDF. It would also appear that the SDF became internally
divided over die issues of industrial conflict and international relations
as new figures in the party, such as Zelda Kahan, began to challenge
Hyndman, Quelch and the odier established leaders of the SDF/SDP.
Undoubtedly the rising emphasis which the SDF placed upon Socialist
Unity was a distraction from these internal conflicts but it was hardly
going to offer a solution to the conflicts within the SDF/SDP nor a
solution to the problem of policy as it emerged in the British Socialist
*' ILP News, October 1901.
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Party. The SDF/SDP may have become less narrowly economically
deterministic in its attitudes but the dominating influence of Hyndman's
view was still present in the vital years when the BSP was being formed.
There were quite clearly other factors which encouraged the idea of
reviving Socialist Unity apart from the convenience it offered to
the SDF/SDP. The membership of all socialist organisations rose
substantially between 1906 and 1909. In addition, the return of 29 LRC
MPs to Parliament brought an optimism about social change that was
not going to be realised, even by a Labour Party working upon a
reforming Liberal government. The contrast between Labour Party
inaction and rising socialist ambitions certainly increased tensions
between some members of the ILP and the Labour Party.
Victor Grayson echoed this disillusionment on Parliament following
his success in the Colne Valley parliamentary by-election in 1907. His
views were outlined in a book entitled The Problem of Parliament—A
Criticism and a Remedy, published in 1909 and dedicated to 'H. M.
Hyndman, R. Blatchford and J. Keir Hardie, who can give this country
a Socialist party tomorrow if they care to lead the way.'44 At much the
same time E. R. Hartley was arguing in a debate at Manchester that
the ILP was 'swamped' within the Labour Party.45 Indeed, between
1909 and 1911, 46 branches of die ILP collapsed. The moment seemed
propitious for a renewal of die Socialist Unity debate.
Indeed, die criticism of the ILP intensified. Towards the end of 1910
four of the fourteen members of die NAC of die ILP signed die
pamphlet Let Us Reform the Labour Party, better known as the 'Green
Manifesto'. Written by J. McLachlan, a Manchester councillor, intro-
duced by Leonard Hall, and contributed to by C. T. Douthwaite and
die Rev. J. H. Belcher, it attacked the ILP and Labour Party tendency
to sacrifice socialist principles in order not to embarrass the Liberal
government. Subsequendy, Fred Jowett criticised diese men for their
lack of loyalty and all lost their seats on the NAC at the annual
conference in 1911.
Also, it should not be overlooked diat in Birmingham, Manchester
and many odier towns, social representation" committees were emerging
to unite socialists of all persuasions. Many socialists were not attached
to die two main socialist parties and a United Socialist Propaganda
League was formed to combine diem together and to spread the
message to die rural areas.46 Indeed, diere was sufficient evidence to
encourage Grayson, now free of his parliamentary duties and political
" Q u o t e d in W. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain (1971), 37.
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editor of the Clarion, that a call for socialist unity would be well received.
As it was, within two months, it proclaimed that 'if the BSP has not
up to the present absorbed at least thirty per cent of the Independent
Labour Party our forms are liars and ought to be torn up.'47 The Labour
Leader countered with the suggestion that only about five per cent of
ILPers had left for the BSP. However, there certainly seemed to be
considerable support as Grayson toured the West Riding of Yorkshire
and south Lancashire addressing 'a magnificent meeting at Colne
Valley' and speaking to large audiences at St George's Hall, Bradford.48
But how many ILP members were won over to the BSP? There is
no denying the divisive impact of Grayson's appeal upon the Yorkshire
ILP branches. Apart from the Colne Valley Socialist League, the
Wakefield ILP branch withdrew from the ILP and a new BSP branch
of 70 members was formed.49 A large number of individual members
of the ILP also joined the BSP. Grayson's estimate of thirty per cent,
however, may have been excessive. An estimate of twenty per cent
would appear to be nearer the mark,50 and Crick has suggest about
twenty five per cent for Lancashire.5' Within a couple of years the
figures were to diminish significantly as individuals and branches drifted
out of the BSP. J. Bruce Glasier's comment in October 1911 ultimately
proved correct: 'The new party is merely the SDP under a new name.'52
In the meantime the SDF/SDP was conducting its own moves
towards socialist unity and suggesting to its members that they should
not complete the Clarion forms but await the Unity Conference at
Manchester. Grayson's response to this was to suggest, in advance of
Glasier's comment, that their plan will amount to 'little more than an
enlargement of the SDF.'53 Blatchford gave his support and suggested
that beyond the basic principles of socialism the BSP would be a wide,
all-embracing party, committed to both industrial and political action.54
The potential was there for conflict but matters went smoothly on the
weekend of 30 September to 1 October when the Socialist Unity
Conference was held at Manchester, at which delegates claiming to
represent 35,000 members, including 41 ILP branches, 32 Clarion clubs
and fellowships, 85 SDF/SDP branches, 50 local Socialist Societies and
47Ibid., 13 October 1911.
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12 branches of the new BSP, plus other organisations, attended.
Yet the tensions soon surfaced for the Conference set up a Provisional
Committee to prepare the constitution and Grayson, a member of that
committee, soon realised that the SDP/SDF would not cease to exist
as a separate organisation until the first annual conference in 1912.
However, his main objection was that the Provisional Committee, of
which he was a member, had not been given the authority to set up
the BSP and he felt that the 'new Party must make a fresh start or it
is doomed to failure.'55 Nevertheless, the BSP was formed by the SDP
and Grayson withdrew his support, many of his followers lost interest
in the BSP and the Colne Valley Socialist League whilst still sending
delegates to BSP conferences never paid its fees. The membership
claimed by the BSP on the eve of the first annual conference were thus
exaggerated. The 1,000 members claimed by the West Yorkshire District
Council included several hundred members from Colne Valley who
were not paying membership fees to the BSP and the 400 members
claimed for Bradford seems something of an exaggeration.56
There is, perhaps, only a fine distinction to be drawn between the
loss of support resulting from Grayson's departure and that which
resulted from the internal difficulties within the movement, for both
sprang from the dominance of the old inflexible SDF/SDP leadership
which, as in the past, continued to undermine any possibility of
achieving socialist unity. There may have been moments when the old
SDF leadership proved less than dominant but not in the years 1911
and 1914. Hyndman's opening address to the first annual conference
of the BSP in April 1912 also betrayed the contradictions within the
Party. Whilst emphasising the success of the new body he admitted
that there had been difficulties. Most revealing was his reference to the
syndicalists, a group of industrial activists led by Tom Mann who hoped
to capture the existing trade-union structure for the rank and file and
to bring unity and militancy to trade unionism.57 Although the BSP
had declared itself for both industrial and political action, Hyndman
returned to his old criticism of industrial action stating that 'of the
futility of resuscitated syndicalism it is needless to speak. There is
nothing real and nothing ideal in the floundering and hysterical
propaganda of segregated grab.'58
Such a statement from the chair made the 'old guard' position clear.
They would concede that 'The political and industrial organisations of
the working class must be complementary to each other', but their
bid., 5january 1912, in an article written jointly by Tom Groom and Victor Grayson.
^Justice, 2 March 1912, and 9 December 1911.
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view that the main function of the Socialist Party was the organisation
of an independent political party of the working class' remained
unchanged. Campaigning along this line appeared in the pages of
Justice and the British Socialist before the first annual BSP conference in
May 1912 and this thwarted the efforts by E. C. Fairchild, and other
old SDF stalwarts, to synthesise political and industrial action.59 Thus
when, Leonard Hall, a syndicalist, moved an amendment at the first
annual conference to reduce 'the organisation of an independent
political party of the working class' to the one main function of the
Party he met with vehement opposition. 'The Trades Union Congress
was the expression of their industrial action', said Quelch, and it 'would
be gross impertinence on their part to say the main functions of a
Socialist Party was to organise and conduct industrial operations.' Hall's
amendment was defeated but it had gained the support of about a
third of the delegates with forty-six for and 100 against.
The syndicalist debate continued for several months with Hyndman
and Harry Quelch attempting to counter the syndicalist articles and
speeches of Gaylord Wilshire, Leonard Hall and Russell Smart. The
eventual brake came in October 1912, when the BSP Manifesto was
issued, emphasising the primacy of political over industrial action. Hall
and Smart rejected the Manifesto and were supported by the Rev
Conrad Noel, also a member of the Executive Council, who considered
it to be 'disastrously one-sided' and felt that it did not express 'the
feelings of the members of the British Socialist Party'.60
This division of opinion cut right across the BSP and halted its
progress in its tracks. Fred Knee reflected this block to growth in his
annual report in The Socialist Annual of 1913, commenting that
I finished my last year's article on a note of exultant hope. This time
I have to strike a lower key. Despite the unity achieved at Manchester
in the autumn of 1911, and the subsequent formation of the British
Socialist Party, the movement has not done well, the new body has
spoken with too many tongues, and till now it has lacked anything
like unity of purpose or of doctrine.6'
Many BSP branches were clearly divided on the issue. The Huddersfield
BSP, led by Arthur Gardiner, was a strong advocate of industrial action
partly owing to the local popularity of H. Russell Smart, who had once
contested Huddersfield in a parliamentary election, and also owing to
the pioneer propaganda work on E.J. B. Allen, who lived locally.61' It
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passed a resolution committing itself to socialist representation and 'to
assist in the building up of a powerful union movement'.63 In other
areas there was serious division within the local BSP branch. This was
most evident in the case of Birmingham where H. B. Williams, the
Secretary of the local branch, found himself in conflict with Leonard
Hall, Thomas R. Wintringham and others over industrial unionism,
the 'Graysonian clot' on the party and other related issues.6* Industrial
unionism was to prove a stumbling block to the BSP as industrial action
had proved to be to the SDF in earlier years.
This split was, however, just one of the tensions that divided the BSP.
International affairs and defence matters continued as source of internal
conflict for in December 1912 Zelda Kahan succeeded, by the narrowest
of margins, in getting the BSP to oppose increased government naval
expenditure in opposition to Hyndman.65 As a consequence the old
guard of the SDP/SDF rounded upon her and her supporters through
articles in Justice to reverse the decision. As a result she resigned, citing
the dangerously imperialistic attitudes of 'our Fuhrer' as being a cause
of danger to the BSP but noting that the Executive has reversed the
decision on armaments in the absence of four important opponents of
the idea and with only five Executive Committee members present.66
Internal conflict, very much engendered by the intransigence of
Hyndman and his supporters, led to the rapid decline of the BSP.
Support had faded away, particularly in Yorkshire where only the
slimmed down Bradford branches, and the Leeds branches directed by
Bert Killip, appear to have carried any significant weight. Even then,
the Leeds BSP decided in April 1913, by a large majority, to affiliate to
the local Labour Party.67 The BSP faced further problems as Twentieth
Century Press, which produced Justice and other socialist journals, fell
into the hands of the receivers as die new company failed to raise an
eighth of die share finance it required.68 The 'enrol a Million Socialists'
campaign, begun in August 1912, also failed to get anywhere near the
100,000 it wished to win in less than a year, never mind die million it
hoped for in five years.69 In fact BSP membership fell from a claimed
63
 A. Gardiner Scrap Book. The source of the newspapers quotation is not indicated.
64BSP Papers 1910-1914 (Birmingham), in the British Library or Political and Economic
Science, Coll. Misc. 155, M228, collected by H. B. Williams. Note particularly item
48/49/5-, and item 46, the letter from Wintringham to Williams.
65
 Look at Zelda Kahan's article 'Peace and its Perils' in British Socialists, I, 1912, 56-68
and Justice from December 1912 to March 1913.
66Justice, 15 March 1913.
67
 Bradford Pioneer, 11 April 1913.
mJustice, 8 February 1913.
^The Clarion, 21 June 1912 referred to the BSP decision to go for five million members
during the next five years but in the same issue a report on the first annual conference
of the BSP refers to H. Russell Smart stating the objective of raising 500,000 Socialists
174 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
40,000 in 1912 to a mere 15,313 by the time of the 1913 Blackpool
Conference.70 By 1913, the BSP was little more than the old SDP/SDF
rump.
In such a climate of failure the BSP reversed overnight its policy of
viciously attacking the Labour Party and the ILP and once again
attempted to woo the ILP and the Labour Party. In the summer of
1913 the BSP leaders met with ILP and Fabian representatives to discuss
the formation of a 'United Socialist Council', and membership of the
Labour Party. Presiding over this love feast was the International
Socialist Bureau. The suddenness of this transformation was remarkable
for an organisation which had unstintingly criticised the Labour Party
for its lack of class struggle and had complained that it was 'nothing
more or less than the tail of the capitalist Liberal Party'.7'
Nevertheless, many of the old guard came out in support of die new
line, including H. M. Hyndman, Zelda Kahan, J. Hunter Watts, Fred
Gorle, and Dan Irving and George Moore Bell, who summed up the
new spirit when he wrote that
The English people won't have a Socialist Party. They like compro-
mise, and the Labour Party is a compromise. Up to date a very poor
one; but it is there and we are here. It lacks spirit and courage, and
knowledge. Are we going to help it get these things? Shall we take
the field, or shall we leave it to the Liberals?72
These views were opposed by Harry Quelch, who was ill and died in
September 1913, Thomas Kennedy and H. Russell Smart who felt that
Socialism would be 'thrust into the background in favour of weak and
ineffective reformist policy'73
Finally, die December 1913 Conference of die BSP decided to hold
meetings with the ILP and the Fabians in order to organise four socialist
demonstrations in 1914—at Cardiff on 1 March, Newcastle on 8 March,
Glasgow on 15 March and at Leeds on 22 March, and others to be
held later. The Third BSP Conference held in London 1914 went
further and, having debated Socialist Unity decided upon holding a
referendum of its members on Socialist Unity and affiliation to the
Labour Party.74 The result was a marginal victory in favour of affiliation
to the Labour Party by 3,263 votes to 2,4io.75 As a result the BSP
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applied to join the Labour Party on 23 June 1914 and affiliated in 1916.
In October 1916 a not very effective United Socialist Council was also
formed.76
Stephen Yeo has written that the formative socialist period of the 1880s
and 1890s was 'too exciting to last' and added that 'Socialism in that
period had not yet become the prisoner of a particular elaborate party
machine—a machine which would come to associate its own well-being
with the prospects for Socialism.'" He was right for by the mid and
late 1890s party electioneering was rapidly taking the place of the task
of 'making socialists'. By that time, also, the ILP and the SDF had
become almost sectarian in their approach which meant that there was
little prospect of creating a Socialist Unity party. If it was the ILP
leaders who were intransigent opponents of Socialist Unity in the 1890s,
as they sought the support of the trade unions, it was equally the case
that the SDF/SDP leaders of the 1911 to 1914 period were also
intransigent for there was little evidence that Hyndman was going to
change his mind on the issue of industrial action and defence. Martin
Crick might be right that Hyndman's domination of the SDP/SDF
was not total but it was still sufficient, until he was effectively ejected
in 1916, to thwart attempts to united and keep socialists on one mass
party.
In the final analysis, Socialist Unity was effectively a non-starter after
the formation of the LRC in 1900, if not before, killed by the rigidity
of both ILP and SDF leaders. Hardie, Hyndman and their close
supporters had ensured that this would be the case. The fact that there
were close relations between the ILP and the SDF branches, and dual
membership, in some areas like Lancashire is of little significance
because, as Jeff Hill noted, the sheer flexibility of the Lancashire SDF
branches made them prone to internal strife and compromise. In any
case areas like the West Riding of Yorkshire were dominated by the
powerful Bradford and Halifax ILP organisations who would have no
truck with Socialist Unity and were already operating a trade union
alliance. By 1909 Victor Grayson's appeal to Hyndman, Blatchford and
Keir Hardie 'who can give this country a Socialist party tomorrow if
they care to lead the way' was already too late. As the Communist
Party of Great Britain, the successor of the BSP, was to find, mass
party socialism within a united socialist party in Britain has proved to
be an appealing illusion.
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